Much has been said about the institutional determinants of transitional justice (TJ), yet we still know little about the determinants of citizens' attitudes towards restorative policies aimed at addressing human rights violations of the past. This paper draws on an original survey of a representative sample of Spanish citizens conducted in 2008. One year earlier, the Spanish socialist government had approved the so-called "Law of Historical Memory", aimed at providing restitution for victims of the Spanish Civil War (1936)(1937)(1938)(1939) and the Francoist dictatorship ). We analyze individual-level attitudes towards a set of TJ policies (i.e. truth commissions, trials, and symbolic reparations) in a comprehensive overview of the field. We study the effect of different sets of variables: individual socio-demographic and ideological factors, family and socialization variables, and context-related factors. Individual ideology, family victimization during the dictatorship and regional context appear as highly relevant in explaining individual attitudes towards TJ policies.
Introduction
The expression "transitional justice" (hereafter, TJ) refers to a set of procedures that are predominantly adopted during democratization periods -but also sometimes when democracy has been consolidated (Aguilar, 2008a; Thoms et al., 2008) -in order to deal with atrocities committed by the former regime or during a violent conflict. TJ procedures fall into three broad categories: (1) justice measures aimed at punishing former perpetrators for human rights violations or depriving them of illegitimate privileges; (2) policies aimed at providing material and/or symbolic reparation for victims; and (3) truth revelation procedures. 1 The study of TJ policies is a burgeoning field of social research, but there are still a number of lacunae to be filled. For example, while the vast majority of the literature on TJ has focused on explaining the institutional determinants of these policies or on the normative discussion about their desirability, 2 there has been little research on public opinion regarding TJ. In some existing works, the opinion of citizens has been inferred from the pressures exerted by social organizations (Skaar, 1999) . This is problematic, because it cannot be assumed that there is a direct relationship between the demands promoted by organizations or pressure groups and the general preferences of the citizenry. 3 Moreover, many of the existing scholarly contributions on bottom-up demands for TJ draw on ethnographic research including interviews and/or observational participation (Theidon, 2006; Ferreira, 1999) , interviews with specific focus groups (Grodsky, 2008; Martín Beristain, 2008; Strover and Weinstein, 2004; ICTJ, 2004) , or interviews with particular subgroups of the overall population, e.g.
victims (Espinoza Cuevas, et al. 2003; ICTJ, 2008) or pressure groups (Backer 2003) .
In short, barring very few exceptions, scholars have not relied on systematic generalizable evidence of individual attitudes towards TJ policies. 4 In this paper, we make a two-fold empirical contribution to this literature: first, we explore data from a hitherto unexploited representative survey of the Spanish population, which we designed and was implemented by the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (hereafter, CIS) in April 2008; second, this survey is a monographic study, which provides us with detailed information on different TJ measures (i.e. commissions, trials and symbolic reparations), as well as on a number of independent and control variables.
This type of fine-grained data is a valuable resource from which we gain empirical leverage.
At the theoretical level, this paper contributes to a better understanding of TJ by presenting a set of hypotheses on the determinants of individual-level attitudes to these policies, which are grounded in TJ literature and also in the literature on victimization and intergenerational transmission of identities. The latter is particularly relevant for understanding the Spanish case, where the most traumatic and violent events are not recent (the Civil War ended 70 years ago, the dictatorship more than 30 years ago), and therefore a vast majority of the population did not experience the violations at first hand. Even though we focus on the Spanish case, we intend to generate implications for other transitional/post-transitional countries that share some basic characteristics with
Spain.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we introduce the Spanish case and outline its importance for the study of transitional and post-transitional justice; in section 3, we present the theoretical framework and hypotheses, which we empirically test in section 4. To conclude, we discuss our findings and their implications for other cases.
Transitional Justice in Spain
The Spanish case is particularly appropriate for TJ research: the severe brutality and prolonged violations perpetrated by the Franco regime against those on the losing side in the Civil War (1936 War ( -1939 , and against all those who subsequently refused to comply with its dictates , are well-known. Throughout the civil conflict, tens of thousands of people on both sides lost their lives as a result of both legal and extrajudicial executions. 5 However, political violence continued during the early years of the postwar period; estimations suggest that the Franco regime executed approximately 50,000 people, that the number of prisoners in concentration camps amounted to 300,000, and that hundreds of thousands were forced into exile.
Throughout Franco's entire rule, tens of thousands of people who had been expelled from their jobs after the war as a result of their ideological leanings were systematically denied reinstatement. The regime also refused to offer pensions or any compensation whatsoever not only to war-disabled veterans and civilians, but also to the widows and orphans of defeated combatants. Likewise, political parties, trade unions and private individuals had their assets seized simply for having sympathized with the Second Republic (1931 Republic ( -1936 ; meanwhile, those who had supported the victors enjoyed numerous perks and privileges.
After Franco's death, the presence of the traumatic memory of the Civil War and the obsessive desire to avoid its repetition encouraged the main political actors and the majority of Spanish citizens to look to the future by putting aside the thorniest aspects of the past. It was firmly believed that this was the only way to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy (Aguilar, 2002 (Aguilar, , 2008b 
Theoretical Framework
In this paper, we argue that attitudes to TJ are determined by a combination of individual, family and context-related (i.e. regional) factors. Over the following pages, we outline the theoretical significance of each of these factors, and the different mechanisms through which they are likely to have an impact on attitudes towards TJ.
Individual Factors
Individual characteristics are essential in explaining variation in political views; the list of relevant individual-level factors explaining variation in attitudes towards TJ is potentially endless. Therefore, we concentrate only on those we deem most relevant theoretically:
The respondent's age is an obvious factor in explaining differences in political views. With regard to TJ on past events, one would expect older people to be more reluctant to support reparation policies because of their personal proximity to traumatic events. The mechanism driving this is fear, which might be operating more or less specifically: on the one hand, people may have a specific fear of reprisal from those who would be negatively affected by these policies (i.e. ex-victimizers); 9 on the other hand, people may have a more general fear of a return of the conflict or the authoritarian regime (Nalepa 2007 
Socialization and Family Factors
The traditional focus of sociologists on the impact of family views and values in the formation of individual perceptions about life is reasonably intuitive. The literature on intergenerational transmission of political views underwent rapid growth in the seventies when Styskal and Sullivan (1975: 516-7) concluded:
"Parents -the most trusted and revered of individuals in a person's early years -are the single most important force in transmitting party identification […] that choice of party, the substantive meaning of the party for the individual and the individual's orientation toward issues are more the products of loyalties derived from parents early in one's life, when cognitive processes are relatively underdeveloped, than the result of reflective decisions about alternatives in the political arena."
Indeed, despite the popular belief that during adolescence children will turn away from their parents in search of alternative guidance for value orientation, most empirical research reveals a striking concordance between the worldviews of parents and those of their (adult) children (Acock and Bengtson, 1980; Beck and Jennings, 1991; Dalhouse and Frideres, 1996; Jennings and Niemi, 1974; 1981; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009; Miller and Glass, 1989) . Thus, individuals are expected to favor TJ policies to the extent that their parents do so. Moreover, we might argue that individuals will favor TJ policies if they adopt the condition of "victim" from their ancestors.
Psychological effects of violence and other forms of victimization have been widely studied in the academic literature on conflict (e.g. the well-known "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" or PTSD). However, the specific effects of traumatic experiences on individuals' identities and behavior have generally been overlooked (Balcells, 2007) , partly due to a lack of appropriate data for conducting empirical analyses. Although the recent development of surveys and experiments in postwar settings has prompted the development of empirical studies tackling these issues, the evidence is still quite fragmented and refers mainly to the short-term effects of traumatic events (e.g. Bellows and Miguel, 2008) . Neither do we find a much better state of the art in the study of individual experiences of dictatorships, and their subsequent preferences and opinions, both during and after democratization processes.
This literature has usually focused on the role of political activists or highly committed individuals (Maravall, 1978; Ferreira, 1999) , with only some recent developments concerning rank and file individuals (Wittenberg, 2006) .
Thus, the existing literature cannot provide an answer to the question of whether victimization generates long-term consequences on attitudes towards TJ measures.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that, given the positive impact of personal victimization on support for reparation policies on a short-term basis (Nalepa, 2007; Gibson, 2002 Gibson, , 2004a Gibson, , 2004b Gibson, , 2007 Biro et al. 2004) , victimizing experiences of family ancestors should also lead to favorable attitudes regarding reparation policies. The mechanism leading towards an intergenerational transmission of these attitudes should be the same as that which explains intergenerational transmission of political identities. In short, we can formulate the conjecture that victimization is a condition that is transmitted to descendants through socialization processes.
Contextual Factors
The literature has nevertheless found that the family is not the only socialization source for individuals: adult re-socialization experiences (both individual -partner, friends-and contextual) can erode the primary socialization effects of the parents. Thus, the broader context in which the individual lives, works and relates to other people can also have an influence on attitudes towards policies. Contextual factors can be varied and complex, as are the mechanisms through which they operate; a clear contextual variable, albeit not the only one, is the individual's political community, e.g. the locality or the region. Within the community, the individual interacts according to a particular set of cultural repertoires and discourses, and there is peer-reinforcement of these discourses. Irrespective of individual and family factors, if the citizens of a particular region or locality perceive that they have been distinctively victimized, we may think that they will hold more favorable attitudes towards TJ policies than elsewhere.
[ 
Empirical Test
In this section we will verify the explanatory power of each of the factors indicated above by examining data from the aforementioned CIS survey, which sampled 2,936 respondents throughout the country and is representative of the over-18 Spanish population. 13 Conducted over a 10-day period through face-to-face interviews lasting around 30 minutes, this monographic survey on "historical memory" included 70 questions about historical and political knowledge, political attitudes and behavior, and socio-demographic characteristics. To test our hypotheses, we include three subsets of independent and control variables in a set of step-wise binary and ordinal logistic regressions. We include a first set of independent variables measuring individual characteristics: (1) Age: we expect older respondents to be more reluctant to support TJ measures; we also expect to find some sort of interaction between age and the size of the respondent's locality due to the anonymity provided by large localities. 17 
[Figures 2-4 about here]
These graphs indicate that, except in the first case (truth commissions),
Spaniards are overtly supportive of TJ policies. This is interesting, as the strong resistance to the "Law of Historical Memory" displayed by the main right-wing party in Spain (Partido Popular) and the conservative mass media would lead us to expect a greater degree of opposition to these policies. We also observe that people are more prone to agreeing to symbolic reparations (withdrawal of symbols) than to the other two TJ measures (truth commission, trials). This is rather intuitive and consistent with patterns observed in other cases, e.g. the American South (Sheridan, 2009 [ Table 1 about here]
Model 0 in Table 1 reveals an interesting result that confirms our expectations regarding the interaction between respondent's Age and Size of locality: the main effect of age is negative, i.e. the older the respondent, the less likely she is to accept the creation of commissions. However, this main effect changes depending on whether the individual lives in a small town or a large city: older people in large cities are less reluctant to support the creation of commissions than those in small towns (regardless of age, the smaller the town, the more reluctant an individual will be). Again, this can be We have tested for the interactive hypotheses between reported victimization and age (model 4). Our expectation was that the impact of victimization would decrease among younger respondents, yet we cannot fully confirm this conjecture as this interaction is not statistically significant (although it has a positive sign). Thus, victimization seems to be strongly transmitted to new generations: its impact, which is positive and highly statistically significant, does not change with the respondents' age.
Note also that the main effect of Age scarcely changes and remains negative in the victimization models; this means that, for those who report past experiences of family victimization, support for TJ is independent of their age.
Finally, Model 5 indicates that Catalan respondents do not differ from those from other regions in their propensity to accept commissions, whereas the Basques are generally more likely to support this sort of reparation.
[ Table 2 about here] the holding of trials than respondents in other territories, and this effect is greater in the former territory than in the latter.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 tests the determinants of attitudes towards symbolic reparation measures; the dependent variable measures approval of the withdrawal of symbols of
Francoism. The first model (Model 0) suggests -as in Table 1 -that even though older respondents are generally more reluctant to support this symbolic reparation, those living in larger urban areas are less likely to be so. Furthermore, as in Table 1 , the only significant socio-demographic variables are -in addition to respondent's age-Ideology and Religiosity. In this case, the position of the respondents appears to be heavily dependent on family variables (Model 2). Indeed: there is an almost linear association between family leanings in the civil conflict and respondent attitudes regarding this measure: whenever the respondent recalls a Francoist past in her family, her likelihood of accepting this form of symbolic reparation significantly decreases, as compared to those who claim to have roots on both sides. And when the individual comes from a family that fought on the Republican side, she is more likely to accept this reparation, as compared to those whose relatives were divided on both sides. Victimization (Model 3) is more significantly related to our dependent variable than in the previous models (Tables 1 and 2 ). Both estimates of victimization (victimization by of Francoism and bythe Nationalist side during the Civil War) are significant here. Interestingly, the interaction between victimization and respondent's age (Model 4) is not significant, implying that this effect is equally important among respondents of all ages. Our final model (Model 5) reconfirms the Basque and Catalan specificity; this regional effect is again stronger in the former region than in the latter.
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A caveat to our empirical results is that the observed effects of victimization on attitudes towards TJ are an artifact of an endogenous relationship between reported victimization and ideology. It could be that those identified with the left are more prone to report past victimization experiences than those who identified with the right. A graphic inspection of the distribution of these two sub-samples along the ideological axis allows us to observe that these two subsamples have almost undistinguishable distributions.
[ Figure 5 about here]
However, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on the distribution along the ideological axis (i.e. left-right) of the sub-samples of victimized/non-victimized individuals suggests that these samples are significantly different, non-victims being located further to the right than non-victims (Table 4 ). This indicates that endogeneity cannot be completely discarded.
[ Table 4 about here]
Unfortunately, we do not have an instrumental variable for 'victimization', or an experimental design, which would allow for a better identification strategy. We nevertheless believe that the fact that we have controlled for the effect of each of these variables (i.e. ideology and victimization) on the other by including them in the same regression model should give us some degree of methodological comfort.
To summarize, the general patterns identified in these results above are as follows: respondent's ideology and religiosity are decisive determinants of support, more conservative and religious people being the most reluctant towards TJ policies.
The fact that the Catholic Church, in contrast to what happened in countries like
Argentina, has never shown any regret for its support of Francoism (both during the Civil War and the dictatorship), may help to explain why, still today, religiosity is negatively associated with support for TJ measures. The effect of other individual-level variables is modest. Age is a relevant predictor of support, older respondents being less likely to support TJ. This variable appears to have a differential impact across town of residence; the effect of being older is stronger (more negative) in smaller towns, which tallies with the observed resistance to TJ policies in small villages (Aguilar 2008b) .
Education is only significant in one of our models although, interestingly enough, its coefficient has a negative sign in all models of the three tables.
Regarding the impact of family socialization, we find that, 70 years after the Civil War and more than 30 years after the dictatorship, reported victimization -suffered by the respondent or their relatives-is crucial in explaining current attitudes towards TJ.
This conclusion suggests that more attention should be paid to personal and family experiences in the formation of political views and attitudes, especially if they are traumatic. In South Africa, Backer (2006) has found significant differences between direct victims of the Apartheid and the rest of the population regarding satisfaction with the TRC. In Rwanda, a survey study of the ICTJ has also found that "personal experiences shaped respondents' attitudes" (referred in Thoms et al. 2008: 79) .
In general, the impact of victimization is unrelated to the respondent's age, which confirms the decisive importance of intergenerational transmission of views about traumatic events. 35 The only exception to this is the significant effect of the age parameter on support for trials (Table 2) ; one explanation could be that reparatory aspects of justice are more likely to be transmitted across generations than retributive ones. This might also be indicative that the revenge impulse tends to fade over time, whereas the need to see the victims properly redressed may be more easily and frequently maintained.
Finally, we have found that contextual factors are relevant in explaining attitudes towards TJ policies. In this paper we have focused on regional-level factors, which are intuitively very relevant in the Spanish case, with the Catalan and Basque minorities.
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However, differences could also occur at other levels of aggregation. For example, Arjona (2009) has emphasized the importance of the municipal level for reparation policies in Colombia. The significance of these contextual differences will depend not only on the existence of different victimizing experiences, but also on a certain degree of collective self-awareness and mechanisms for its reproduction.
Conclusions
Frequently starting from normative rather than empirically demonstrated assumptions, the TJ literature has traditionally focused on the different political strategies developed by political actors either to promote or to oppose institutional arrangements aimed either at redressing victims or at bringing perpetrators to justice. In doing so, there has been a tendency to disregard public opinion towards TJ policies. This is unfortunate, as the use of surveys gives us "a better sense of how pro-and anti-TJ constituencies emerge" (Thoms, 2008: 47; 78 were victimized during the dictatorship. We have also identified some contextual (regional) differences, which make the likelihood of supporting TJ greater in those parts of the country where strong and differentiated ethnic or national identities prevail.
While the findings related to ideology, religiosity, age or town size may be dependent on the specificities of Spain (even though some could be relevant in other cases), a lesson that transcends this case is that policies that are perceived as being less aggressive, such as withdrawing symbols of the past (something that does not entail digging into the past to identify human rights violations and perpetrators), are more widely supported by the citizenry. In contrast, measures perceived as more risky (i.e.
creation of truth commissions and holding of trials) are less widely supported by citizens. The importance of differentiating between the more moderate and the more radical instruments, and even attempts to create an ordered scale or a "spectrum" of TJ policies, has started to be considered in the literature (Payne et al., 2008; Grodsky, 2009 ). In other words, TJ measures do not appear to be reducible to a single dimension;
and, depending on their nature, different interventions are likely to generate different levels of popular support.
The results illustrate the long-term relevance of victimization and socialization on political identities. On the one hand, individuals do not seem to be forgetful of their history, i.e. the mere passage of time does not necessarily contribute to oblivion. In Spain, the lack of appropriate TJ measures may have prevented victims and their relatives from leaving the past behind. On the other hand, the condition of victim, which may be more or less specific (i.e. relating to the family or the political community), seems to travel from one generation to another and to have clear-cut political consequences. Interestingly, Carmil and Breznitz (1990) reached a similar conclusion in their research on the effect of the trauma derived from the Holocaust experience on both the survivors and their descendants. Indeed, even if in this paper we have focused on attitudes towards TJ policies, the effects of victimizing experiences are likely to be broader (e.g. on political identities) (Balcells, 2007; Wood, 2008) .
To conclude, our work underscores the importance of micro-level data for the study of TJ, which can reveal unpredicted empirical patterns. For example, at the mere descriptive level, our study has clarified the views of Spaniards regarding TJ issues. Our data demonstrate that, contrary to what has been commonly assumed, Spaniards are reasonably supportive of the application of TJ policies. 37 In fact, the data indicates that the average Spanish citizen would have endorsed a more ambitious legal application of TJ principles than that provided for in the 2007 "Law of Historical Memory". Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 (1) The reference category comprises those who said their family fought on both sides during the Civil War.
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(2) The reference category comprises all other Spaniards. While the latter caveat applies to any policy, it is particularly relevant in the case of TJ for a number of reasons: firstly, civil society is likely to be weakened in the aftermath of an authoritarian experience and/or a violent conflict, and organizational resources to lobby for TJ are likely to be scarce. Secondly, even if there is an underlying desire for these type of measures in society, people are not likely to openly request them for fear of political destabilization, residual power of the repressive actors, and the like. A notable exception is Gibson's (2002; 2004a; 2004b) research in South Africa.
Through representative surveys at national level, his research has focused on the reconciliatory effects of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as well as on the social perception of justice derived from this institution. Nalepa (2008; 2010) has also implemented representative surveys in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic on matters related to TJ policies. Other studies based on survey research are listed in Thoms et. al. (2008: 78-85) .
5
The estimated death toll during the Civil War is 800,000, of which around 122,000 are estimated to be civilian victims of intentional lethal violence -of these, 84,095 were victims of Francoist violence, and 37,843 were victims of Leftist violence (Juliá 2004 ).
6 Aguilar (2008a) argues that a crucial factor explaining the resurgence of this debate is the arrival in the public sphere of the "grandchildren of the war", who were free from the fears and guilt of their parents. Davis (2005: 868) has pointed to the importance of Pinochet's arrest in London -after an initiative by the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón-in understanding these changes. See, for example, Nalepa (2007) for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary; David and Choi (2006) for the Czech Republic; Theidon (2006) for Peru; Gibson (2002 Gibson ( , 2004a Gibson ( , 2004b Gibson ( , 2007 for South Africa; Biro et al. (2004) for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.
9
The effect of the perceived threat from members linked to the authoritarian regime is studied by Nalepa (2007) , who finds it to be a significant predictor of attitudes towards lustration in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. This factor was also found to be significant in South Africa (Gibson, 2004b) .
11
In Spain, leftist ideology would be expected to be associated with support for TJ policies. The opposite would apply in other contexts (i.e. post-Communist settings).
12
Nonetheless, we will empirically explore a different set of interactions.
13
The Basque Country and Catalonia are over-represented, with 699 and 683 respondents, respectively. In our analyses, we take into account this over-representation so that the results are perfectly representative of the whole country. The same scale as in 2 applies.
17
Town size is entered as an ordinal variable (on a scale 1-7) following the usual coding in CIS surveys. The categories are: 1 = 2,000 or fewer inhabitants; 2 = between 2,001 and 10,000; 3 = between 10,001 and 50,000; 4 = between 50,001 and 100,000; 5 = between 100,001 and 400,000; 6 = between 400,001 and 1,000,000; 7 = more than 1,000,000. Indeed, education and interest in politics are two mandatory controls in our estimation, since individuals scoring higher in one or both are much less likely to give a "does not know" type of answer. Adding these controls helps to avoid sample bias.
20
The variable has the values 1 for primary education or less; 2 for secondary education; 3 for university degree.
21
This is a scalar variable that goes from 1 to 6, where 1 is non-religious (i.e. the respondent identifies herself as atheist or non-religious) and 6 highly religious (i.e. the respondent says that she goes to mass several days a week).
22
While the impact of religion on Spanish politics is not as strong as it used to be, it remains a significant factor explaining voting and electoral competition (Montero et al., 2008) .
23
This variable measures the self-reported position on the left-right scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).
24
We measure this with the question: "As far as you can remember, which of the two sides that fought the Civil War did your family most identify with, the Republicans or the Nationalists?" ["Nationalists" is the name that was given to Franco's supporters during the Civil War]. Possible responses are: 1 = Nationalist; 2 = Republicans; 3 = Both; 4 = Neither. This question has been used in previous surveys conducted by the CIS. In our survey, the response rate to this question (77%) was higher than in any previous one. We include this variable in the regressions as two different dummies:
Family Nationalist Side, and Family Republican Side.
25
"When you were a child or adolescent, how much did they talk about politics at home?": 4 = Very much; 3 = Quite a lot; 2 = A little; 1 = Not at all.
26
To be consistent with the traditional male preeminence in Spanish culture we use father's position on the ideological scale. The correlation between the father's ideology and the mother's is very high (0.77), so we cannot include both of them in the same regressions. Using the mother's ideology implies no change in our results (these are available upon request). Since our indicator was reported by the respondent, some bias may exist (i.e. the respondent bringing her father closer to her ideological positions). Yet, the correlation between the respondent's ideology and her father's is not dramatically high (0.55).
27
We do not take into account victimization by the Republican side during the Civil War, as we would not expect this to have straightforward effects on attitudes towards TJ. As we explained, victims of the Republican side received reparations in the past. Current TJ measures are connected to reparation for Francoist violations.
28
Victimization includes any of the following: death in combat; death in bombardment; homicide; death penalty; disappearance; imprisonment; flight from Spain; was forced into hiding; was expelled from work. We label this variable "Victim of Nationalist Side during CW".
29
This includes any of the following: arrest; imprisonment; was expelled from work; was fined; was forced to leave the country; was executed. We label this variable "Victim of Francoism".
30
Due to the limited number of cases in the group of people with direct victimizing experiences, we include family and individual victimization experiences together. We have also run analyses without those with personal victimizing experiences, and the results are consistent.
31
According to Thoms et al. (2008: 81) ,"different regions (…) are likely to have quite different views on TJ", and they recommend "over-sampling", as we have done in our study.
32
The rate of "doesn't know" responses is 16.12% for truth commissions, 14.7%
for trials, and 9.91% for symbols. We must bear in mind that the question about the creation of a truth commission had a different set of response categories than the others; in this case, the intermediate category of "indifferent" is absent, which may have pushed the respondents toward either one of the two extremes: agree-disagree.
33
Note that missing data implies a reduction in the size of the sample used for the estimations of models presented in tables 1, 2, and 3. Re-estimating them using selection models that correct for potential selection bias in our dependent variables implies no changes to our conclusions.
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Though we do not have enough space to develop on the differences between Basques and Catalans regarding their support of TJ policies, one explanation could be that Basque nationalism is more extreme than Catalan. While in the Basque Country there is a significant tendency to consider Spanish and Basque identities as incompatible, in Catalonia dual identities (people feeling simultaneously Spanish and Catalan) are more frequent (this can be seen in our survey: available upon request).
Given that Francoism was characterized by the aggressive imposition of Spanish identity and the repression of minority identities, a more extreme ethnic identity may be leaning towards a greater support for TJ measures.
35
Similarly, in the South African case it has been confirmed that "young blacks are not more likely to be reconciled than older blacks" (Gibson, 2004b: 215) .
36
This result ties in with Gibson's (2004a) finding regarding the importance of racial identities in explaining the acceptance of TJ measures in South Africa.
37
In most of the few existing studies based on survey data, support for TJ measures shows to be more common than the opposite (Thoms et al, 2008: 78) .
